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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT EXEMPTION FROM
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE MIDCAL TEST AFTER BOULDER
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act (Act)' to pro-
hibit large business concerns from practicing various kinds of anticom-
petitive activity in interstate commerce.2 The Sherman Act proscribes
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade3 and
monopolies,4 but does not describe specifically all the acts included under
the forbidden arrangements.' Legislative history indicates that Con-
Pub. L. No. 190, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
2 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2562 (1890)
(remarks of Sen. Sherman)). Senator Sherman declared that the Sherman Act (Act) only
prevented business combinations in restraint of trade. Id. at 351. A combination is the
association of two or more persons for the attainment of some common end. Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Remarks of other
senators indicate that Congress intended the Sherman Act to prevent combinations of
private persons, whether individual or corporate, in restraint of trade. 21 CONG. REC. at
2562, 2728.
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, com-
bination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade" in interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
Restraint of trade includes conspiracies, contracts or combinations of persons, including cor-
porate persons, with the intention of eliminating or reducing competition or creating a
monopoly. See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 30 (1920). Restraints of trade
might also include attempts to maintain prices artificially or other actions designed to inter-
rupt the natural course of trade and commerce. Id. Under the Sherman Act, interferences
with free competition that tend to restrict production or affect prices are illegal per se. See
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980)
(resale price maintenance constitutes per se violation of Sherman Act). Alternatively, some
restraints are subject to a rule of reason analysis. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
255 F.2d 214, 230 (9th Cir. 1958). The rule of reason applies to restraints of trade ordinarily
reasonable, but made unreasonable because the violator specifically intends to accomplish
the equivalent of a forbidden restraint, as for example, the reduction of competition. Id.; see
infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (under rule of reason analysis, restraint of trade is
defensible only if negative competitive effect is not unreasonable).
' 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 of the Act prohibits monopolization. Id. Monopoly, as
prohibited by § 2 of the Act, has two elements: possession of monopoly power in the rele-
vant market and willful acquisition of that power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570-71 (1966). Courts distinguish an improper use of monopoly power from growth of a
monopoly as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. Id.;
see United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Minn. 1971) (Sherman Act
condemns monopoly possessing power to fix prices or exclude competition, coupled with
policies designed to preserve that power). Section 2 of the Sherman Act also prohibits per-
sons from combining or conspiring to acquire or maintain power to exclude competitors
from any part of trade or commerce. Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 613, 617
(W.D. Mo. 1962). To violate § 2, persons must use their market power, as a group, to exclude
actual or potential competition, and must intentionally and purposefully exercise that
power. Id. at 617-18.
1 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 n.32 (1978).
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gress intended that federal courts determine the scope of these forbid-
den arrangements in light of the Act's expressed purpose to prevent
restraints on competition.' In 1897, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Act's constitutional validity, emphasizing Congress' com-
merce clause power.' Since that time, the Court has extended the prohi-
bitions of the Act to cover a wide variety of business activities in inter-
state commerce.'
In 1904, the Supreme Court held that a municipality was a person
within the meaning of the Sherman Act, thus enabling a municipality to
maintain a federal antitrust action in its own name. For many years,
however, the Supreme Court did not address whether the Act pro-
scribed anticompetitive municipal action."0 Federal courts assumed that
the principles of federalism, which protected anticompetitive state ac-
tion from the purview of the Act," extended to the actions of states'
political subdivisions." In several recent decisions, however, the
6 Id. (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2460, 3148 (1890)). The Judiciary Committee of the Senate
considered it impractical for Congress to set down precise and all-inclusive definitions of
prohibited conduct in the Sherman Act, and believed courts more capable of handling the
matter of definition. See 21 CONG. REC. at 2460, 3148 (1890). Senator Hoar, who helped draft
the Act, noted that Congress intended to provide the courts with the power and the Depart-
ment of Justice with the duty to prevent all combinations in restraint of trade. See 36 CONG.
REC. 522 (1903).
' See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 309-43 (1897). In
Trans-Missouri, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the Sherman Act for the first
time. Id. at 309-43. Two years earlier, the Court had refused to apply the Sherman Act in a
case involving the direct monopolization of the manufacture of refined sugar. See United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1895). In E.C. Knight, the Court held that
manufacturing was not commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause. Id. at 16-17.
After the Trans-Missouri decision, the Court began to distinguish the E.C. Knight holding.
See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234-48 (1899). In Addyston
Pipe, the Court, in holding that the Sherman Act could apply to the conspiracy in question,
noted that the case differed from E. C. Knight in that the Addyston Pipe conspiracy directly
restrained not only the manufacture, but also the purchase, sale or exchange of the manu-
factured commodity, iron pipe, among the states. See 175 U.S. at 234-48.
' See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-55 (1951) (Act ap-
plied to newspaper in Ohio with daily circulation of over 20,000 copies, only 165 of which
went to subscribers outside Ohio); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396-98 (1905)
(Act applied to livestock dealers in different states when plaintiffs alleged combination of
dealers to control cattle prices); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325-27
(1904) (within Act's purpose to break up holding company's joint control of competing
railroads). But see Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922)
(Sherman Act inapplicable to major league baseball).
' Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906); see
Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is person within meaning of Sherman Act
for purpose of bringing own antitrust action).
" See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 429 (1978)
(Court addressed question of municipal antitrust immunity for first time).
" See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (anticompetitive state program im-
mune to Sherman Act liability).
,2 Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 551 (M.D.N.C.
1979).
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Supreme Court limited the scope of state action immunity for certain
parties, including municipalities and local governments. 3 Under current
law a federal court may impose antitrust liability on a municipal govern-
ment if the municipality fails to satisfy the Supreme Court's strict stan-
dard of state authorization required for all anticompetitive municipal
action.'4
The Supreme Court first clearly enunciated the doctrine of state
governmental immunity from federal antitrust laws in the 1943 case of
Parker v. Brown.5 Parker involved a challenge under the Sherman Act
to a California state program that authorized state-wide organizations to
develop marketing policies for the state raisin crop. The Court con-
sidered the legislative history of the Sherman Act and found that Con-
,3 See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (municipality may be held liable under federal antitrust law); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976) (state regulated private utility must show state
commanded anticompetitive behavior to obtain antitrust immunity); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (state agency may be held liable under Sherman Act).
" See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-57 (1982)
(Court clarified standard of state authorization necessary for municipality to maintain im-
munity from federal antitrust laws). In addition to potential liability under the Sherman
Act, a municipality may incur liability under the Clayton Act. See The Clayton Act, Pub. L.
No. 212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Section 14 of the Clayton Act prohibits tying arrangements and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). A tying arrangement is an agreement between two
persons, in which one agrees to sell one product, the tying product, only on condition that
the other person also purchases another product, called the tied product. Northern v.
McGraw-Edison Co, 542 F.2d 1336, 1344 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977). An
exclusive dealing arrangement involves an agreement to deal exclusively with one buyer or
seller. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1961). Section 15 of the
Clayton Act provides for treble damages when a plaintiff proves any violation of either the
Sherman Act or Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
," 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Before the Parker decision, the Supreme Court had addressed
the state action problem only once, in a case decided in 1904. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S.
332, 338-39 (1904). In Olsen, the Court upheld a Texas regulatory scheme giving commis-
sioned pilots a monopoly on pilotage service for Texas because the state had sovereign
power to regulate pilotage. Id.
" Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. In Parker, a California statute authorized producers to
create marketing programs for agricultural products cultivated in the state. Id. The pur-
pose of the program was to preserve the state's agricultural wealth and prevent economic
waste in marketing agricultural products. Id; see California Agricultural Prorate Act, ch.
754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969 (current version codified at CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§
59501-60015 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979)). The statute authorized the establishment of an
Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission under which producers of a particular commod-
ity could petition the Commission for the establishment of a prorate marketing program.
Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-47. Pursuant to the raisin producers' request, the Commission
established a prorate marketing program for raisins to alleviate chronic and harmful over-
production. Id. at 347-48. Under the prorate marketing program, a committee composed of
producers and packers controlled the marketing of raisins and never sold raisins below the
prevailing market price in order to achieve market stability. Id. The plaintiff in Parker, a
producer and packer of raisins who had entered into contracts for the sale of raisins prior to
the adoption of the prorate program, sought to enjoin appellants from enforcing the pro-
gram. Id. at 349.
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gress intended to prevent "business combinations" but did not intend to
restrain legitimate state action." The Parker Court noted that the state
of California had "commanded" the anticompetitive activity and had
taken an active role in approving and enforcing the program. 8 The Court
held that the state had acted lawfully as sovereign to replace competi-
tion with regulation. 9 In later cases, federal courts labelled the Parker
exemption from the federal antitrust laws the state action doctrine.'
After Parker, federal courts tacitly assumed that the state action
doctrine extended to local and municipal governments acting pursuant
17 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. Although the Parker Court clearly expressed the view that
Congress did not pass the Sherman Act to restrain legitimate state action, the Court
referred to an earlier antitrust decision and declared that a state cannot provide immunity
for those who violate the Act by authorizing them to violate it or declaring their action
lawful. Id.; see Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904) (holding
company's acquisition of rival railroads violated Sherman Act). The Parker Court also refer-
red to another case in which the Court upheld a permanent injunction against a municipality
for having violated a different federal act. 317 U.S. at 351-52; see Union Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 450, 453, 474 (1941) (Court upheld injunction against city illegally receiving
rebate on transportation of food by common carrier through city-owned railroad terminal).
Unlike the Union Pacific Court, the Parker Court did not face the question of a state or
municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement in restraint of trade. 317 U.S. at
351-52. By citing the Union Pacific decision, however, the Parker Court implied that a state
or municipality might not be immune from the Sherman Act in the private agreement situa-
tion. Id. Recent Supreme Court decisions have relied on the Parker implication to hold that
private companies and state agencies are not exempt automatically from federal antitrust
laws simply because the state acquiesced in the challenged activity. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585, 598 (1976) (state regulated private utility not immune from an-
titrust laws for anticompetitive action acquiesced in and not commanded by state); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (Virginia State Bar acting as state agency
for some limited purposes not immune under Sherman Act when Bar voluntarily joined in
essentially private anticompetitive activity).
" Parker, 317 U.S. at 350; see supra note 16. The Parker Court noted that the Califor-
nia Prorate Advisory Commission only established a prorate marketing program after
holding a public hearing. 317 U.S. at 346. Once the Commission granted a petition, the Direc-
tor of the Commission would select a program committee composed of producers and
packers to formulate a proration marketing program, which the Commission could approve
or modify. Id. at 346-47. The committee then would supervise the operation of the program,
but the state would enforce the program. Id.
19 Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. The Parker Court relied on two earlier cases. See id.; Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904) (discussed supra note 15); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F.
908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). The Lowenstein court addressed the issue of whether South
Carolina's monopoly in the purchase, transportation, and sale of liquor violated the recently
enacted Sherman Act. 69 F. at 911. The Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina
found no substantive violation of express provisions of the Act since the state neither made
any contracts nor entered into a combination or conspiracy. Id.
See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975) (Court denied State and
County Bar antitrust protection for set fee schedules under so-called state action doctrine);
Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1973) (court
upheld state action defense in rejecting claim of conspiracy between state agency and
private competitor of plaintiff).
[Vol. 40:143
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to state grants of authority.2' In the meantime, however, the Supreme
Court recognized greater congressional power to regulate under the
commerce clause.' Concurrently, the Court's view of state power nar-
rowed.' Since 1975, the Supreme Court has decided several cases that
have dramatically narrowed the scope of state action exemptions.' The
Court held that municipalities and local governments do not enjoy
automatic immunity from federal antitrust laws simply because of the
governments' status as political subdivisions of a state.' In three recent
2.1 Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 551 (M.D.N.C.
1979); see E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55-56 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). In E. W. Wiggins, the plaintiff charged that the Port
Authority had engaged in a conspiracy to deny the plaintiff a license to operate at Logan
Airport, and that the Port Authority was subject to suit under the antitrust laws for con-
ducting a private business in a purely proprietary capacity. 362 F.2d at 55. The First Circuit
upheld a dismissal of the plaintiffs claims because the Port Authority acted under
authorization from the state that established the Port Authority as a public corporation. Id.
at 55-56. Therefore, according to the court, any actions in which the Port Authority engaged
pursuant to the state's authorization, constituted a valid exercise of governmental power.
Id.
See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 420-21
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (municipality may be held liable for violating federal anti-
trust laws); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964) (motel that pro-
vided lodging to transient guests affected interstate commerce per se); Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-55 (1951) (newspaper's actions covered by federal anti-
trust laws even though paper only reached 165 out-of-state readers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (Court upheld congressional commerce clause power to regulate
amount of wheat farmer grew for personal consumption).
3 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (Court
reversed trend of applying federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state
employees); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (state-owned railroad subject
to liability to injured employee under Federal Employers Liability Act).
" See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Uo., 426
U.S. 579, 594-95 (1976). In Bates, the plaintiffs claimed that an Arizona State Bar rule pro-
hibiting lawyers from advertising services violated the Sherman Act. 433 U.S. at 354-56.
The Superme Court held that the Arizona State Supreme Court, which promulgated the
rule, provided sufficient state authorization to exempt the advertising ban from the pur-
view of the Sherman Act. Id. at 359-63. The Court nevertheless invalidated the rule for
violating the first amendment rights of plaintiffs. Id. at 363-82.
In Cantor, the Court held that a private electrical utility, allegedly monopolizing the
light bulb market, did not qualify for a federal antitrust exemption when the state merely
acquiesced in the challenged activity. 428 U.S. at 594-95; see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court held that the Virginia Bar's minimum fee
schedule constituted price fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976); supra note 3 (price fixing is per se violation of Sherman Act). The Goldfarb Court
noted that neither the state court nor any state statute actually required the Bar to adopt
the fee schedule. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
" See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-57 (1982)
(home rule status for city insufficient state authorization to provide city with immunity
from federal antitrust law); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
394-417 (1978) (plurality opinion) (municipality lacking proper state authorization for anti-
competitive actions may be liable under federal antitrust law).
1983]
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decisions the Court established a standard of state authorization that
local and municipal governments must meet to qualify for a state action
exemption from the federal antitrust laws.26
In the 1978 decision City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.,' the Court addressed for the first time the question of municipal an-
titrust immunity.28 A divided Court rejected two municipalities' claims
of absolute immunity from the federal antitrust laws.29 In Lafayette, two
cities that owned and operated state authorized municipal electric
systems sued Louisiana Power & Light, a privately owned utility, under
the federal antitrust laws. Louisiana Power & Light counterclaimed,
alleging that the cities had committed various federal antitrust offenses
while operating the municipal electric systems." In rejecting the cities'
claim of absolute immunity, the four member plurality opinion held that
the municipalities must have "state authorization" for alleged anticom-
petitive action before the action will be exempt from federal antitrust
scrutiny.2 The Court stated that a political subdivision of a state need
not point to a specific detailed statutory mandate before properly assert-
ing a state action defense.3 3 Rather, the Court held that sufficient state
authorization would exist if the legislature "contemplated" the kind of
2 See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (under two-part Midcal test, state must
clearly articulate and affirmatively express policy to displace competition, and state must
actively supervise the activity).
435 U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality opinion).
28 Id. at 394-417.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 391-92. The plaintiff cities in Lafayette charged the defendant Louisiana
Power & Light Co. and other private electric utilities with conspiracy to restrain trade in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and with monopolizing the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electric power by preventing the construction and operation of com-
peting utility systems in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 392 n.5; see 15 U.S.C. §§
1-2 (1976); supra notes 3-4 (discussion of Sherman Act).
"' Lafayette, 435 U.S. 392. In Lafayette, Louisiana Power & Light Co. alleged a con-
spiracy between the cities and a nonparty electric cooperative to prevent the construction
of Lousiana Power & Light Co.'s nuclear power plant. Id. at 392 n.6. The private utility also
alleged a conspiracy to eliminate competition within the cities' boundaries and in other
markets by the use of long-term supply agreements. Id. The final allegation stated that the
cities attempted to displace the private utility in certain areas by requiring that the utility's
customers purchase electricity from the cities as a condition of continued water and gas ser-
vice. Id.
Id. at 408-15. The Lafayette plurality stated that Parker did not equate political sub-
divisions with sovereign states and also that in other areas of the law the Supreme Court
has not accorded cities the same deference accorded states under federalism doctrines. Id.
at 408, 412; see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (cities not sovereign under tenth or
eleventh amendments). The plurality expressed the fear that if cities within the same state
are free to approach policy decisions on their own, each may express its own "parochial
preference" in adopting anticompetitive restraints rather than the preference of the state.
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 (plurality opinion).
3 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
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action identified in the complaint. 4 But the plurality provided no
guidelines for determining sufficient state contemplation of a particular
local action. 5
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger focused on the nature
of the challenged municipal activity The concurrence distinguished
municipalities engaged in "proprietary" or business activities from
municipalities engaged in traditional government activities. 7 When a
municipality engaged in a proprietary activity, the concurrence would
have required that the state actually command the municipality to per-
form the anticompetitive action before granting the municipality an
exemption.' Otherwise, the concurrence suggested approval of the doc-
trine of per se immunity from the federal antitrust laws for municipali-
ties engaged in traditional governmental activities. 9 The Lafayette
plurality never adopted the concurring opinion's proprietary-nonproprie-
tary distinction, and in a subsequent decision a majority of the Court
clearly rejected the distinction.4"
The Lafayette dissent vigorously defended the cities' claim of ab-
solute immunity from the federal antitrust laws.41 The dissent, relying
Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434-35
(5th Cir. 1976)).
Id. at 415-17; see infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (courts deciding state
contemplation issue differently on similar fact situations). Compare In re Airport Car Ren-
tal Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (legislative enactments clearly
contemplated challenged limit on number of rental companies leasing space at airport,
despite lack of specific statutory authority) with Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025, 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (cities lacked statutory authority to grant taxi service
monopoly at municipal airport). Several lower federal courts admitted confusion as to the
actual standard the Lafayette Court adopted. See, e.g., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of
Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982);
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 552 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 418-25 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice rejected arguments that
the tenth amendment applied in Lafayette, but he hinted that municipalities might qualify
for automatic immunity from the federal antitrust laws in some circumstances. See id. at
421-24. The concurrence stated that the running of a business enterprise, such as an elec-
trical service, is not an integral operation of a state in the area of traditional government
function, and therefore the Court need not defer to tenth amendment principles of
federalism. Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 425 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In Lafayette, the Chief Justice placed par-
ticular emphasis on the allegation that the cities made a profit on the municipally owned
electrical operations in support of his position that the cities were operating a proprietary
enterprise. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 422-25 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
,2 See id. at 391-417; see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 50 n.13, 52-57 (1982) (city engaged in nonproprietary action not immune from federal
antitrust law); infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (same).
"' See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426-41 (Stewart, J,; dissenting). Ironically, Justice
Stewart cited the same Parker dicta in support of his Lafayette position as the Supreme Court
19831
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on National League of Cities v. Usery,42 argued that the tenth amend-
ment forbids interference with a state's freedom to allocate governmen-
tal power to political subdivisions as the state wishes.13 The dissent
referred to a footnote in the National League of Cities opinion that, in ef-
fect, equated interference with a state's political subdivision as interfer-
ence with the state itself. 4 The Lafayette plurality rejected the interfer-
ence argument su Mimarily by stating that nothing in National League of
Cities supported the dissent's position. 5 Instead, the plurality cited with
approval Supreme Court decisions interpreting the eleventh amendment
and holding that cities and counties are not sovereign states within the
previously had used to lifisit the state action doctrine. Id. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)). But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943)). Justice Stewart
cited the Parker statement "the state or its municipality" to support his position that
Parker equated the state and the municipality with regard to immunity from the federal an-
titrust laws. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra note 17 (Parker dicta implied that state
or municipality might not have immunity from Sherman Act when participating in private
agreement to restrain trade).
42 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
13 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1, Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
855 n.20 (1976)). The National League of Cities Court stated in a footnote that political sub-
divisions derive power from the state and that Congress therefore, in the exercise of its
commerce clause power, must give political subdivisions the same deference given states.
426 U.S. at 855 n.20. The National League of Cities Court held that states are free under
the tenth amendment to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional government
function." Id. at 852. Traditional areas of operation refer to, among other things, fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, parks, and recreation. Id. at 851-52;
see Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-68 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
In Gold Cross, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri applied the state
action exemption to a city maintaining a monopoly ambulance service. 538 F. Supp. at
965-67. The Gold Cross court, however, also found the city immune from the feaeral anti-
trust laws under the tenth amendment. Id. at 967. The Gold Cross court found the city's
regulations a legitimate exercise of the city's police power for the general public welfare, a
right reserved, according to the court, to states and their subdivisions. Id. The Gold Cross
court relied on National League of Cities to support the position that a city has sovereign
immunity from federal antitrust laws. Id. (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 851 (1976)). The Gold Cross court recognized, however, that a recent Supreme
Court decision substantially narrowed the broad language of National League of Cities. Id.
at 967-68 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287
(1981).
In Lafayette, the plurality clearly rejected the argument that cities are sovereign
within the meaning of the tenth amendment by stating that National League of Cities did
not establish a "principle of presumptive congressional deference" toward cities. See City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 n.42 (1978). In Boulder, the
Court affirmed the Lafayette decision by noting that the United States is a "nation of states
that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of states." Commuity Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50 (1982). Thus, the Gold Cross tenth amendment
argument is probably erroneous in light of the Boulder decision. Compare Boulder, 455 U.S.
at 50 with Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 967-68.
11 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 n.42 (plurality opinion).
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meaning of the eleventh amendment and thus are subject to suit in
federal court.48 By analogy, the plurality held that municipalities cannot
claim sovereignty under the tenth amendment.4 7 In a separate opinion,
Justice Blackmun joined the Lafayette dissent to warn of the danger of
subjecting municipalities to potential treble damage awards under the
Clayton Antitrust Act4 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun would have
held a municipality liable if the municipality conspired with private par-
ties to the detriment of another private party.4 9
46 Id. at 412 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974), and Lincoln Coun-
ty v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890)). The eleventh amendment, like the tenth amendment,
supports principles of federalism by prohibiting citizens from suing a state in a federal
court. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In Lincoln County, a county claimed immunity from a
suit in federal court in which the plaintiff alleged that the county had defaulted on the in-
terest payments for a bond issue. 133 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court held that the
eleventh amendment does not protect counties from suit in federal court. Id at 531. In
Edelman, the Supreme Court applied the so-called stripping doctrine to state officials
unlawfully withholding welfare payments. 415 U.S. at 664. The stripping doctrine allows a
federal court, in effect, to strip a state official of his state authority and thereby permits a
suit against him in federal court. See id. at 651-68. The Supreme Court established the strip-
ping doctrine to enable a citizen to circumvent the prohibition of the eleventh amendment
when a state official pursues a policy that violates a citizen's federal and constitutional
rights. See id. In Edelman, the Court noted that political subdivisions cannot claim eleventh
amendment immunity to suit in federal court because subdivisions are not states within the
meaning of the amendment. Id. at 667 n.12.
'" See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 n.42. The Lafayette plurality held that if cities are not
sovereign under the eleventh amendment, then cities are not sovereign under the tenth
amendment. Id.
'a City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (provides for treble damages whenever
violation of Sherman or Clayton Act occurs). In Lafayette, the potential damages under a
single claim of the private utility amounted to $540,000,000, the result of trebling the
damage claim under § 15 of the Clayton Act. 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The
Lafayette dissent noted that the two cities had a combined estimated population of 75,000
and that ultimate liability would bankrupt the cities. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). As yet, no
federal court has held that a municipality actually violated federal antitrust laws and
therefore the question of treble damage liability for a municipality remains unanswered.
See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.20 (1982). The
Lafayette and Boulder Courts specifically noted that the cases did not require that the
Courts answer the question of appropriate damages because liability under the antitrust
laws remained in issue. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401 n.22.
Nevertheless, the Lafayette and Boulder dissents expressed the view that in the event of
actual antitrust liability for a municipality, a federal court will have a difficult time refrain-
ing from imposing treble damages because the language of § 15 of the Clayton Act requires
a court to award treble damages for any violation of the antitrust laws. See Boulder, 455
U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440 n.30 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). In one recent case, a court denied a city's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of the city's liability for treble damages. See Grason Elec. Co. v.
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276, 282 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
" Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Lafayette Court remanded
the case to determine whether the cities had in fact been operating under sufficient state
authorization to qualify for an exemption from federal antitrust laws. 435 U.S. at 425
(Burger, C.J., concurring). The litigants, however, apparently settled the claims after the
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In 1980, the Supreme Court decided California RetailLiquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.5" Midcal involved a wine
wholesaler's claim that California's wine pricing system constituted
resale price maintenance5 ' in violation of the Sherman Act." A
unanimous Court" announced a two-part test, derived from previous
state action cases involving state agencies and private organizations, for
determining what constitutes proper state authorization in federal anti-
trust cases. 4 The first prong of the Midcal test required "clear articula-
tion and affirmative expression" of state policy regarding the challenged
activity.5 The second prong required "active state supervision" of the
activity. The Midcal Court held that the California program met the
first prong of the test, but failed the active state supervision require-
ment because the state simply authorized price setting and neither
established prices nor reviewed the reasonableness of the price
schedules established by private parties. In Midcal, the Court applied
the two-part test to a state program organized for the benefit of private
wine producers. 8 Thus, the Midcal Court did not clearly decide whether
the two-part test would apply to municipal and local government claims
of immunity from federal antitrust laws. 9 In 1982, the Court directly ad-
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court. See Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v.
Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 555 n.22 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (citing Note, The Erosion
of State Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165, 190 n.130 (1978)).
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
5' Id. at 100-01; see Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 575 F.2d 1169, 1171
(6th Cir. 1978) (defining resale price maintenance). Resale price maintenance is an agree-
ment between a manufacturer and a retailer that the latter will not resell the
manufacturer's product below a specified minimum price. Rubbermaid, 575 F.2d at 1171.
52 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 100; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (resale price maintenance violates § 1
of Sherman Act).
' Midcal, 445 U.S. at 114. Justice Brennan did not take part in the consideration of the
Midcal case. Id.
' See id. at 104-05; see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (Court first
enunicated standard of antitrust immunity later known as two-part Midcal test); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-92 (1975) (first case in which Court limited scope of
state action doctrine). In Bates, the Supreme Court held that rules against lawyer advertis-
ing were immune from Sherman Act challenge because the rules "reflected a clear articula-
tion of the state's policy" regarding professional behavior and were "subject to pointed
reexamination" by the Arizona Supreme Court in enforcement proceedings. 433 U.S. at 362.
" Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104-05.
56 Id.
"7 Id. at 105-06. The Midcal Court stated that the California legislature clearly and
forthrightly intended to permit resale price maintenance, but the state failed to engage in
any "pointed reexamination" of the program. Id.
See id. at 97-106.
" See id. at 105. The Midcal Court cited Lafayette as established precedent for the
two-part test. Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (plurality opinion)). But in fact the Lafayette plurality only stated the test in its
clearer, present form during the plurality's review of the Bates holding. See Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 410; see supra note 54 (citing the two-part test as originally stated in Bates). The
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dressed the application of the Mideal test to a municipality in Commun-
ity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder."
In Boulder, a cable television operator claimed that a city ordinance,
which imposed a ninety-day moratorium on cable television market ex-
pansion, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The defendant Boulder
argued that as a home rule municipality under the Colorado Constitu-
tion, the city had sufficient state authorization to take any action regard-
ing the regulation of the local cable television business." A majority of
the Court disagreed, and held that a home rule amendment which pro-
vides a city with the right of self-government in municipal matters does
not indicate a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy to displace competition with regulation. 3 Inasmuch as the or-
dinance lacked specific sovereign authorization, the Boulder Court con-
sidered it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinance "must or could"
satisfy the second part of the Midcal test requiring active state super-
vision of the activity. 4
Lafayette plurality never specifically applied the two-part Bates test for determining a
municipal government's antitrust immunity. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410. Actually, the
Lafayette plurality impliedly equated the two-part test with a requirement that the state
actually command the anticompetitive activity before a court could grant an exemption. See
id. at 410 n.40. But the Lafayette plurality never endorsed a state command or compulsion
standard for a municipality claiming state action immunity. See id. at 389-417. A strict state
command standard would conflict with the plurality's approval of a lower level of statutory
authorization, state contemplation of the challenged activity. See id. at 415.
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
61 Id. at 46-47. Community Communications Company (C.C.C.) intended to expand its
cable television business within the city beyond the area the city originally assigned to the
Company. Id. at 44-45. The Boulder city council subsequently enacted an emergency or-
dinace prohibiting C.C.C. from expanding its business for three months, during which time
the council was to draft a new ordinance and invite new cable businesses to enter the
market under the terms of the city's new ordinance. Id. at 44-47.
Id. at 46-47. In the original Boulder case, the District Court for the District of Col-
orado rejected the city's claim of a Parker exemption, relying on the Supreme Court's
holding in Lafayette. See City of Boulder v. Community Communications Co., 485 F. Supp.
1035, 1039 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The Tenth
Circuit reversed, holding Lafayette inapplicable. Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The Tenth Circuit con-
trasted the city's regulation of a cable television franchise, involving no municipal pro-
prietary interest, with the municipally operated revenue-producing utility companies in
Lafayette. See id.; supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (proprietary-nonproprietary
distinction discussed).
' Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53-56. In Boulder, the city relied on Colorado state court deci-
sions holding that the citizens of Colorado had vested Colorado's municipalities with every
power the state legislature possessed over municipal affairs when the citizens adopted the
home rule amendment. Id. at 52 n.15, 52-53. The Boulder Court rejected the home rule argu-
ment. Id. Interestingly, the state of Colorado and 22 other states filed amicus briefs in sup-
port of the cable television company. Id. at 71 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Boulder
dissent suggested that the states saw an opportunity to recapture power over local affairs
that the states had lost because of home rule amendments. Id.
" Id. at 51 n.14.
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In the Boulder dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority
violated fundamental principles of federalism by treating political sub-
divisions and private litigants alike when a political subdivision or
private litigant attempts to invoke the state action doctrine. 5 The dis-
sent believed that a more sensible analysis would involve the use of the
supremacy clause and the preemption doctrine." If a court determined
that a municipal ordinance could or did violate the Sherman Act, then
under the supremacy clause the federal Sherman Act would preempt the
local ordinance, unless the ordinance satisfied the dissent's unique ver-
sion of the two-part Midcal testy
The Boulder dissent's view of the Midcal criteria indicates the dis-
sent's perception of municipal action as a reflection of state sovereign
power. 8 The dissent would uphold a challenged municipal ordinance if
the city enacted the ordinance under an affirmative policy to restrain
competition, provided the city actively supervised and implemented the
policy. 9 The Boulder dissent noted that the majority did not consider
whether the contested ordinance met the active state supervision prong
of the Midcal test in view of the majority's finding that the city had
failed the clear state articulation requirement." The dissent implied,
however, that should the majority require active state supervision of
local anticompetitive activities, serious practical limitations would
hinder implementation of active state supervision at the local level. 1 The
' Boulder, 455 U.S. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Boulder dissent noted that
local governments often enact ordinances and regulations aimed at protecting public health,
safety, and welfare. Id. at 60. The dissent stated further that the Boulder decision will "im-
pede, if not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact" such ordinances for fear of
violating the federal antitrust laws. Id.
66 Id. at 61-62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A preemption analysis, as explained in the
Boulder dissent, differs from an exemption analysis because preemption involves the
supremacy clause and the concept of federalism. Id. at 61. The dissent described a preemp-
tion analysis as a court's attempt to resolve a conflict between the enactments of two
sovereign governments, or a situation in which the federal government has occupied a field
exclusively, foreclosing state regulation. Id. When a court finds preemption, the federal law
invalidates or preempts the state law. Id. Because the Supreme Court wishes to protect the
legitimate use of state police powers, however, the Court has been reluctant to infer
preemption. Id.
In an exemption analysis, on the other hand, the Boulder dissent stated that no prob-
lems of federalism are present because the enactments of only one sovereign, the federal
government, are involved. Id. A court simply must determine whether Congress intended
to grant an exemption to the party claiming immunity. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In an
earlier state action case, Justice Blackmun, in a concurrence, advocated a preemption ap-
proach for the Sherman Act. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-14 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
67 Boulder, 455 U.S. at 68-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissent considers states and political sub-
divisions sovereign).
69 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




dissent equated active state supervision with actual enforcement of a
challenged activity, thus implying that Midcal required constant state
involvement in the local action rather than periodic state review.2
The Boulder dissent justified a preemption approach with practical
arguments. 3 By narrowing the issue to one of preemption, the Court
could avoid the problem of having to impose treble damages on munici-
palities in the event of ultimate antitrust liability. 4 If a court were to
find a local ordinance void for being inconsistent with the Sherman Act,
the ordinance simply would have no effect.75 Thus, the plaintiff would
receive injunctive or declaratory relief to prevent further implementa-
tion of the ordinance by local authorities.76 At the same time the plaintiff
would be unable to claim damages because a court would assume that
the local government acted lawfully up to the moment that the court ac-
tually decided that federal law superseded the local ordinance.
The Boulder dissent described a greater potential problem resulting
from the Supreme Court's decision in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States.8 In National Society of Professional
Engineers, the Court held that under the rule of reason applied in some
federal antitrust cases, a private entity could not defend competitive
restraints on the ground that competition is itself unreasonable.79 Under
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra note 57 and accompanying text (Midcal
Court defined active state supervision test in terms of review and pointed reexamination).
"' Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Boulder dissent noted that if a court ultimately
found that a municipality violated the federal antitrust laws, the court would then find it dif-
ficult not to conclude that the municipality was subject to treble damages under the Clayton
Act. Id. at 65 n.2. The Boulder majority, however, did cite the Lafayette plurality's remark
that in a federal antitrust suit, activities that might appear anticompetitive when engaged
in by private parties, may appear differently when adopted by a local government. Id. at 56
n.20; see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 417 n.48 (1978).
The Boulder Court also noted that the decision did not resolve the question of appropriate
remedies against municipal officials. 455 U.S. at 56 n.20. The Court's remarks suggest that
the Boulder majority may be reluctant to impose liability on local governments for some
types of anticompetitive activities and may be averse to imposing treble damages on local
governments. But see supra note 48 (Clayton Act requires mandatory imposition of treble
damages for any antitrust violation).
-5 Boulder, 455 U.S. at 68 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 154-58 (1978) (state tanker regulatory provisions partially preempted by
federal law). But see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (Court
rejected argument that Sherman Act preempted state law that reduced retail gasoline com-
petition).
76 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 154-58 (1978). In Ray, the Supreme
Court affirmed in part the lower court's permanent injunction against state officials who
sought to enforce a state tanker regulatory law that the Court found partially preempted by
the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Id.
7 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 68 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 614 n.6 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (proposing preemption
analysis for application of Sherman Act).
7' Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
7' National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696. Under the rule of reason, a
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the rule of reason analysis, a restraint is defensible only if the negative
effect on competition is not unreasonable or if the restraint actually has
procompetitive effects." Applying the decision to municipal restraints,
the Boulder dissent argued that a municipality could not defend anticom-
petitive actions by establishing the actions' benefits to the community in
terms of traditional health, safety, and public welfare concerns." The dis-
sent pointed out that even if courts modify the rule of reason so that
municipalities can defend regulation on the basis of community benefits,
courts then would have to engage in a review of the reasonableness of
particular local legislation.2 According to the dissent, judicial review
would create an even greater evil, the establishment of the lower federal
court system as a superlegislature sitting in judgment of state legisla-
tures.'
The Boulder decision represents a clear rejection of the proprietary-
nonproprietary distinction that the Chief Justice suggested in
Lafayette.84 The Court rejected the city's attempt to classify the ordi-
nance as a traditional government action distinguishable from the pro-
prietary activity involved in Lafayette.5 Instead, the Boulder Court
clearly required state authorization for all local and municipal anticom-
petitive activities." The Boulder decision apparently ends the possibility
that the Court might carve out an exception to the state authorization
requirement in areas of traditional government function.87 The non-
proprietary nature of the ordinance may account for the Chief Justice's
shift to the dissent in Boulder.8 Justice Blackmun, however, may have
predicated his shift from the Lafayette dissent to the Boulder majority
on a belief that the cities and a rival cable television operator had
engaged in a conspiracy against the plaintiff, Community Communica-
court evaluates the legality of restraints of trade by weighing all the relevant factors in-
cluding the history of the restraint, the evil perceived to exist, and the reason for adopting
the particular remedy. See United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F.
Supp. 457, 460-61 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Il d.
Id. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 68 (citing Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525, 535 (1949)). The Boulder dissent stated that the Sherman Act does not authorize a
federal court to substitute the court's social and economic beliefs for the judgment of an
elected local legislative body. Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50 n.13, 55 n.18, 53-55.
Id. at 47-48. The Boulder Court clearly rejected the Chief Justice's proprietary-
nonproprietary distinction by reversing the Tenth Circuit, which had granted the city of
Boulder immunity primarily on the proprietary-nonproprietary distinction. See id.; supra
note 62 (Tenth Circuit contrasted nonproprietary action in Boulder with proprietary opera-
tion in Lafayette).
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53-55.
See id.
Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tions Company. 9 Any explanation for the shift admittedly is speculative
in view of the two Justices' silence in Boulder." Nevertheless, the
possibility remains that Justice Blackmun, who expressed grave fears
over treble damages in Lafayette, would side with the Boulder dissent in
future cases addressing the extent of municipal liability under the
federal antitrust laws.91
As the test stands after Boulder, regardless of the type of activity
involved, the municipality or local government must act under a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competi-
tion with regulation.2 Nevertheless, two post-Boulder decisions indicate
that the nature of the activity continues to play a decisive role in federal
courts' examinations of antitrust exemptions in the context of municipal
or local regulations. 3
In Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 4 two private am-
bulance companies sued Kansas City and a privately owned ambulance
service for conspiring to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and for monopolizing the local ambulance service industry
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.95 The city had enacted an or-
See Yetter, Local Government Exemption from the Federal Antitrust Laws: Com-
munity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 56 FLA B.J. 565, 565-66 (1982) (citing City of
Boulder v. Community Communications Co., 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630
F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)); see also supra text accompanying note 49
(Justice Blackmun's view that Sherman Act does not exempt municipality engaging in con-
spiracy from antitrust liability). In Boulder, C.C.C. alleged a conspiracy between the city
and a rival company to restrict competition by substituting the rival for C.C.C.. 455 U.S. at
47 n.9. But the district court noted that although C.C.C. had gathered some circumstantial
evidence that might indicate a conspiracy, the evidence was insufficient to establish a prob-
ability that the petitioner would prevail on the claim. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
W Boulder, 455 U.S. at 41, 60. Neither Justice Blackmun nor Chief Justice Burger
wrote an opinion for the Boulder case. See id. at 41; Yetter, supra note 89, at 565-66.
" See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442 (1978)
(Blackmun,' J., dissenting) (expressing grave fears over imposing treble damages on
municipalities).
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53-55.
'3 See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
9 Id. at 959; see supra notes 3-4 (§§ 1-2 of Sherman Act). In Gold Cross, the plaintiff
ambulance companies sued the city and four private defendants who had formed their
separate ambulance companies into a single corporation. 538 F. Supp. at 959. Although the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all the Sherman Act allega-
tions, the court refused to do so with respect to the antitrust allegations against the four
private defendants. See id. at 969, 973. The Gold Cross court reasoned that the alleged ac-
tion of the four private defendants in illegally combining their ambulance service companies
into one to foreclose competition did not qualify for an antitrust exemption. Id. at 969. In
refusing to grant the private defendants an exemption, the Gold Cross court implied that
the individuals had engaged in a private conspiracy to monopolize the ambulance service in-
dustry and that the state action exemption does not shield a private anticompetitive con-
spiracy. See id. at 967; infra note 158 (some courts refuse to grant local governments anti-
trust immunity for otherwise lawful action when plaintiff alleges conspiracy); supra note 17
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dinance that clearly created a private monopoly for ambulance service
within the city limits. 6 The District Court for the Western District of
Missouri noted that the city acted under a comprehensive state statu-
tory scheme regulating ambulance companies, and that one of the
statutes allowed a municipality to decide for itself whether to contract
with one or more ambulance service providers. 7 The court held that the
state statutes satisfied the first prong of the Midcal test by indicating a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to regulate
ambulance service on the basis of public need. The court noted further
that the state statutes clearly contemplated the possibility of munici-
palities imposing restrictions on ambulance service in addition to those
imposed by the state.9
Although the Gold Cross court applied the Midcal test, the court
focused on the nature of ambulance service and the fact that state and
local governments traditionally have regulated ambulance service."' The
court compared Lafayette, in which municipalities sought to increase
revenues at the expense of a private enterprise, with Gold Cross, in
which the city had passed the ambulance ordinance to improve am-
bulance service for the protection of the public safety and health."' The
Gold Cross court's emphasis on local government's traditional regulation
of ambulance service indicates that federal courts may continue to place
great importance, albeit unstated, on the proprietary or nonproprietary
(Parker dicta implied that municipality might not deserve antitrust immunity when par-
ticipating in private conspiracy to restrain trade).
Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 960-61. The city in Gold Cross purportedly had enacted
an ordinance to eliminate the problem of slow responses to emergency calls by private am-
bulance companies observed under the city's former competitive ambulance service system.
Id. at 960. Emergency calls apparently were less profitable for the ambulance companies
than nonemergency calls, and thus the competitive system actually promoted poorer quality
ambulance service in emergencies. Id.
See id. at 964-65.
" Id. at 965. The Gold Cross court noted with approval that the Missouri Supreme
Court had found that the purpose of the state regulatory scheme was to control destructive
competition and improve ambulance service. Id. (citing City of Raytown v. Danforth, 560
S.W.2d 846, 849 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)).
" Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 964 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 190.105.4, 190.105.5 (Ver-
non Supp. 1981)).
"0 Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 968-69. The Gold Cross court contrasted the importance
of the interaction of the state and local regulations in the ambulance service field with
Boulder, in which the Supreme Court found no interaction of state and local regulation. Id.
at 966; see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982)
(Supreme Court cited with approval lower court's acknowledgment of no interaction of state
and city regulation).
,I' 538 F. Supp. at 965. The Gold Cross court noted that the defendant city, to insure
quick and efficient emergency service for its citizens, was willing to subsidize the single
company service if necessary to eliminate the difficulty ambulance companies had in con-
trolling emergency service costs and collecting fees for emergency work. See id. at 960. The
court noted further that the plaintiffs made no showing that the city would derive any
economic benefit from the establishment of a single provider ambulance system. Id. at 965.
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nature of the challenged activity in determining an antitrust exemption
for a local government.
10 2
In another post-Boulder case, Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of
Pueblo,"' the plaintiff alleged that the city of Pueblo violated the federal
antitrust laws by failing to renew plaintiffs fixed base operation 4 at the
municipally operated airport."' The Tenth Circuit, affirming summary
judgment against the plaintiff, noted that one particular state statute
satisfied the Midcal clear articulation requirement for the city."' The
Pueblo court cited statutory language indicating that the state required
the municipality to operate the airport for the benefit of the general
public and not, as the court stated, for the particular advantage of the in-
habitants of Pueblo."1 The Pueblo court stated that in the absence of an
express statutory direction, courts generally regard the operation of an
airport as a proprietary rather than a governmental function."' The
Pueblo court's statement suggests that if the statute had authorized the
municipality's operation of an airport without expressing a public pur-
pose behind the regulation, the court would have been less inclined to
find an exemption as the activity then would appear proprietary in
nature."'
The Pueblo decision suggests that the Midcal clear articulation test
does not clarify how explicit state statutory authorization must be and
fails to indicate whether public policy statements, such as the statement
See id at 964-69.
"3 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No.
82-352).
' Id. at 806-07. A fixed base operation is one in which an operator enters into a lease
agreement with the city to provide specific facilities, services, equipment, and personnel for
the airport. Id. at 806 n.3. Under the lease, the fixed base operator must meet all re-
quirements for those operations of an airport used by aircraft, passengers, crews, and
freight shippers. Id.
Id. at 806-07.
"' Id. at 808; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973). The Pueblo court granted the city
an antitrust exemption by relying on statutory language which stated that the acquisition
and operation of a municipal airport were "public governmental functions, exercised for a
public purpose and matters of public necessity." 679 F.2d at 808 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §
41-4-101 (1973)).
Po ueblo, 679 F.2d at 811; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973).
" pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810-11. The Pueblo and Gold Cross courts continued to justify
challenged activities using proprietary-nonproprietary language even after the Boulder
holding rejected the distinction. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 50 n.13, 55 n.18, 53-55 (1982); Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810-11; Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1982). The Pueblo and Gold Cross
courts' reliance on the proprietary-nonproprietary distinction suggests federal courts' reluc-
tance to abandon the proprietary-nonproprietary distinction as an analytical framework for
distinguishing among anticompetitive activities of local governments. See Pueblo, 679 F.2d
at 810-11; Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 965. But see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text
(Boulder court clearly rejected the proprietary-nonproprietary distinction).
Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810-11.
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cited in Pueblo, constitute sufficiently clear state authorization. " ' The
Pueblo court's approach contrasts with the approach of the court in
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Service, Inc.,"' a post-Lafayette
but pre-Midcal decision."' As in Pueblo, Pinehurst involved a federal
antitrust claim by a plaintiff denied a license to operate at a county-
operated airport.' In Pinehurst, the District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina stated that the operation of an airport is clear-
ly a proprietary function."' The court noted the potential for anticom-
petitive abuses in granting an exclusive license to operate at an airport,
and then reviewed all evidence that might show a legislative intent to
authorize the granting of an exclusive fixed base operation by the coun-
ty." The Pinehurst court cited statutory language that authorized a
municipality to confer exclusive service and facility concessions at the
airport unless the concessions deprived the public of its "rightful and
equal use of the facilities.""' 6 The court then denied an antitrust exemp-
tion to the county, holding that the county board lacked authority to
grant an exclusive fixed base operation under the statute."7 In effect,
the Pinehurst court drew economic conclusions about the reasonable-
ness of allowing an exclusive fixed-base operation and on the basis of its
conclusion decided not to infer legislative authorization. "8
The Pinehurst and Pueblo cases illustrate that different federal
courts may reach opposite conclusions on essentially the same facts."'
The Pueblo court did not draw conclusions about the reasonableness of
the city's action, but simply held that the statutory language calling for
the operation of an airport to benefit the general public satisfied the
"I See id. at 811; Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-57
(1982) (state authorization prong of Midcal test requires clear articulation and affirmative
expression by state for anticompetitive action); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1980) (stating two-part test for state authoriza-
tion of anticompetitive action).
476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
,,2 Compare id. at 552-55 with Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810-11.
3 Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 551. The Pueblo and Pinehurst cases involved claims of
fixed base operators denied licenses to operate at the airports in question. See Pueblo Air-
craft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1982); Pinehurst Airlines, Inc.
v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 552-53 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
,4 See Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 552.
"I Id. at 553-54.
. Id. at 554; see N.C. GEN. STAT. 63-53(3) (1981).
"' Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 554-55. In effect, the Pinehurst court reasoned from the
North Carolina statute's language that the legislature had contemplated limits upon the ac-
tivities of municipalities engaged in the proprietary activity of operating a publicly owned
airport. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-53(3) (1981). The limits, according to the court, clearly
covered the anticompetitive action of granting an exclusive fixed base operation at the air-
port. Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 554-55.
"' Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 554-55.
.9 See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text. Compare Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 811
with Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 555.
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Midcal test." The Pinehurst court, however, based its decision almost
completely on an analysis of the reasonableness of allowing an exclusive
aircraft service operation at a locally operated airport. 21 Similarly, the
Gold Cross court decided the case on a motion to dismiss, but only after
hearing three days of testimony regarding the history and nature of the
ambulance service." The Gold Cross court clearly indicated a belief that
the city had acted reasonably in granting an exclusive ambulance ser-
vice." But the Gold Cross court also cited language indicating that the
legislature had contemplated an exclusive ambulance service. 24 In con-
trast, the Pueblo court, in granting the city an antitrust exemption, cited
no language indicating that the legislature had contemplated exclusive
concessions at the airport. The Pinehurst court, however, which
denied an exemption, at least referred to statutory language indicating
the possibility that the legislature had contemplated an exclusive fixed
base operation at the airport.26
The Pinehurst, Pueblo, and Gold Cross decisions indicate that a
problem may arise in future municipal antitrust cases when federal
courts decide whether mere contemplation of municipal anticompetitive
activity by a state will satisfy the Midcal clear articulation test.' In
"2 See Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 807-08. In effect, the Pueblo court relied on the statute's
public policy statement to grant governmental immunity for any municipal action taken to
effectuate the running of a public airport. See id.
,II See Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 554-55. The Pinehurst court relied on a North
Carolina statute's public policy statement to limit actions taken by the county that might
thwart the public's "rightful and equal use" of the airports. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 63-53(3) (1981).
12 See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 959-60.
'= See id. at 964-66.
12 Id. at 964; see Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 190.105.4, 190.105.5 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
12 See Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 808.
"2 See Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 554; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 63-53(3) (1981).
'1 See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text. Despite some confusion in the
Lafayette decision regarding the appropriate standard, the Court in Lafayette and Boulder
never adopted state "compulsion" as the standard local governments must meet to claim an-
titrust immunity. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-57
(1982); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 n.40 (1978)
(plurality opinion); see also supra note 35 (lower courts admitted confusion as to appropriate
Lafayette standard). In an earlier state action case involving a privately owned utility's
claim of antitrust immunity, the Supreme Court held that a private litigant engaged in an-
ticompetitive behavior would have to show that the state commanded the challenged con-
duct to obtain immunity from the federal antitrust laws. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 585 (1979). But in a footnote to the Lafayette opinion, the plurality noted that
the Cantor Court's analysis did not necessarily apply to municipalities in view of the dif-
ference between a political subdivision of a state and a purely private party. Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 410 n.40; see Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. Rv. 435, 445 n.49 (1981) (compulsion not necessary in antitrust cases involving
public defendants). The Fifth Circuit recently divided on the issue of applying a compulsion
analysis to a private litigant's actions, in light of the Midcal decision. Compare United
States v. Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 1982)
with id. at 482 (Hill, J., dissenting). Although Southern Motors did not involve a political
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Lafayette, the Supreme Court stated that a municipality need not point
to a specific detailed statutory mandate before claiming an antitrust ex-
emption.'lIn Boulder, the Court affirmed Lafayette, holding that a
legislature need only have contemplated the challenged activity for a
court to grant a municipal antitrust exemption. 129 As the Lafayette dis-
sent and the Pinehurst court pointed out, little state legislative history
is available to which a federal district court may refer in determining
whether a legislature contemplated a particular municipal action.13 In
the absence of a state supreme court ruling on a particular local or
municipal action, the only source available to the federal district court
would be the language of the statute.' A federal court's literal inter-
pretation of statutory language undercuts the credibility of the con-
templation approach because a literal statutory interpretation leaves lit-
tle room for legislative contemplation of an anticompetitive activity."2 A
subdivision, the majority noted that the Boulder Court never endorsed a state compulsion
standard for anticompetitive actions by political subdivisions in view of the Boulder Court's
statement that a local government need not point to an express statutory mandate for each
challenged anticompetitive act. Id. at 473 (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49 (1982)); see 455 U.S. at 49 n.12.
'" See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
'29 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 49 n.12 (noting circuit court's standard for determining an-
titrust exemption).
," Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 437 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 551.
In Lafayette, Justice Stewart remarked that "the bare words of a statute will often be
unilluminating in interpreting legislative intent." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 437 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
"' See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit has noted
recently that the highest court of a state is the ultimate interpreter of state statutes and
that the state court's construction binds a federal court. See Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing
Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 995-96 (3rd Cir. 1982). The Eagle Downs court cited the Boulder decis-
ion to support the proposition that interpreting legislative intent is a matter of state law
and that federal courts deciding antitrust liability should defer to state court interpreta-
tions of state law. See id. at 996 n.6 (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 nn.15 & 16 (1982). But see Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654
F.2d 1187, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982) (remanded for
further consideration in light of Boulder). In Hybud, the Sixth Circuit found state authoriza-
tion for the challenged activity in home rule provisions of the state constitution that the
Ohio Supreme Court had interpreted. Id. If the Supreme Court decided to remand because
the Hybud court erroneously relied on the state supreme court, then the Eagle Downs propo-
sition appears questionable. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52 nn.15 & 16 (Boulder Court
equivocated on importance of state supreme court interpretations of home rule
amendment).
132 See, e.g., Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 955-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (court
denied immunity to local government granting exclusive aircraft service concessions at
locally operated airport); Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543,
554-56 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (court denied antitrust exemption to county grantfng exclusive ser-
vice operation at county airport); see also Areeda, supra note 127, at 449 n.64 (noting that
Genesee County and Pinehurst courts cited statutes guaranteeing public access to airport
service facilities as evidence of state intent to limit grant of exclusive aircraft service con-
cessions).
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court that implies state contemplation for a challenged activity when no
statutory language supports the implication, however, undercuts the
usefulness of a clear articulation standard because clear articulation im-
plies that statutory authorization for an anticompetitive activity will be
in clear, unambiguous language.
13
If the Supreme Court truly desires clear state articulation and affir-
mative state expression to support a challenged activity, then a federal
court should rely solely on statutory language to determine whether suf-
ficient state authorization exists.'34 In the absence of state legislative
history, federal courts will have to decide the clear articulation test on
the presence or absence of statutory language in most municipal anti-
trust exemption cases."' In cases in which a clear statutory interpreta-
tion is questionable, the federal courts should construe the language
liberally to find that the state contemplated the challenged municipal ac-
tivity.36 If federal courts do not interpret statutory language liberally,
decisions similar to Pinehurst may occur in which courts will decide a
municipality's claim of antitrust exemption on the basis of courts' at-
titudes toward the reasonableness of the challenged anticompetitive
activity."7
One commentator suggests that the reasonableness approach
typifies a court's approach to resolving difficulties in statutory interpre-
tation. 38 The commentator is confident about the federal courts' ability
' See Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 806-11 (10th Cir. 1982)
(statute authorizing operation of airport for general public provides municipal antitrust im-
munity).
See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 43-57.
' See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.
1982); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 964 (W.D. Mo. 1982);
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 554 (M.D.N.C. 1979); see
also supra notes 94-118 (courts granting or denying antitrust exemptions on presence or
absence of statutory provisions). Although the Supreme Court has not required compulsory
statutory language as the standard for state authorization of a local anticompetitive activity,
compulsory language would be the strongest evidence of state intent to grant an immunity.
See Areeda, supra note 127, at 438; supra note 127 (compulsory language not the standard
established by Court). One commentator noted the irony in the Parker state action doctrine,
which exempts even the most flagrantly anticompetitive actions from antitrust liability if
the actions are part of a clearly expressed state regulatory scheme. Page, Antitrust,
Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Ac-
tion Exemption after Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1099 (1981).
" See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 964.
11? See Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. 543, 554-56 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (court interpreted statutory
language as evidence that state intended to limit exclusive service facilities at publicly
operated airport).
' See Areeda, supra note 127, at 447. Under a reasonableness approach, a court will
infer state intent to displace the antitrust laws if the challenged restraint of competition is a
necessary or reasonable consequence of acting in the authorized area. Id. at 446. In one pre-
Boulder decision, a federal court stated that the court would grant immunity if the challenged
restraint were necessary to the successful operation of the legislative scheme. See Corey v.
Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981).
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to determine reasonableness, but as Pinehurst and Pueblo suggest, the
reasonableness approach may result in different evaluations of similar
activities.3 9 The question of state action exemption is properly one of
law, not fact, whereas questions about an activity's reasonableness
invariably involve interpretations and assumptions of facts. 4 ° A liberal
statutory interpretation favoring state contemplation of a challenged
anticompetitive activity may help insure judicial deference toward prin-
ciples of federalism and may deter a court from denying an exemption on
the basis of the court's attitude toward the municipal action's reason-
ableness.' If the state legislature clearly did not contemplate the activ-
ity, then a court should not find an antitrust exemption. 4' But if a court
interprets unclear statutory language against the municipality by apply-
ing an indefinite "reasonableness standard," then the court's decision
may interfere with a legitimate attempt on the part of the state
legislature to authorize the challenged municipal activity.' Deference,
to principles of federalism, is surely more appropriate for a federal court
than to be acting as a "superlegislature."'" Federal court deference to
state legislatures and principles of federalism will avoid the problem of a
municipality or local government having to return to the legislature
seeking more explicit statutory authorization.'
" See Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 811; Pinehurst, 476 F. Supp. at 555. In Boulder, the dissent
pointed out that questions of reasonableness often arise in an antitrust suit during trial on
the merits. See 455 U.S. at 65-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As the Boulder dissent noted, a
court determining the issue of actual antitrust liability may inquire into the reasonableness
of the competitive restraint, unless the restraint is a violation per se of the antitrust laws.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra note 3 (some competitive restraints are violations
per se of antitrust laws).
"' See Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 997 (3rd Cir. 1982). The
Eagle Downs court pointed out that state action exemption cases clearly indicate that the
issue of governmental immunity involves a question of law, which is generally an issue of
statutory construction. Id. Thus the question of whether a governmental entity is subject to
federal antitrust liability generally is resolved on a motion to dismiss or a summary judg-
ment motion. Id. The Eagle Downs court noted that in Parker, the Supreme Court did not
inquire into the reasonableness of the challenged marketing program, and that federal
courts developed the state action doctrine to avoid such an inquiry. Id.; see Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). Thus, according to the Eagle Downs court, once a
district court finds state authorization for the challenged activity, the court is not justified
in looking into the wisdom or efficiency of using the regulation in question as a means of ac-
complishing the intended objective. 677 F.2d at 997.
... See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). The Hybud court stated that although the tenth
amendment limitation on affirmative congressional action is narrow, a district court should
not read tenth amendment values narrowly when Congress has not expressly or by clear im-
plication displaced a traditional exercise of local police power. Id. at 1196.
142 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55.
"I See Page, supra note 135, at 1124-25.
" See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 78-83 and
accompanying text (Boulder dissent expressed fear that decision would turn federal courts
into superlegislatures overseeing state legislatures).
14 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 438 (1978)
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The Supreme Court could help alleviate the problem of inconsistent
decisions in the lower federal courts by defining the clear articulation
test more narrowly, or alternatively, by carefully indicating that the
state contemplation standard satisfies the clear articulation test.'46 A
narrow clear articulation test should result in fewer municipalities quali-
fying for an exemption but greater uniformity in district court
decisions.'47 Similarly, if the Supreme Court clearly establishes a stan-
dard under which legislative contemplation is sufficient authorization
for the challenged activity, then most statutory authorization more
specific than the Colorado home rule amendment, invalidated as too
general in Boulder, should satisfy the test.'48
The Boulder Court, in failing to find a clearly articulated state policy
to support the city ordinance, did not consider whether a municipality
could or should satisfy the second prong of the Midcal test, active state
supervision.' In the absence of clear. Supreme Court direction, several
lower federal courts have required municipal defendants to satisfy the
active state supervision requirement.50 In Hybud Equipment Corp. v.
City of Akron,"' decided prior to the Supreme Court decision in Boulder,
the Sixth Circuit applied both prongs of the Midcal test."' The court held
that state law clearly authorized a municipal solid waste monopoly and
that the state actively supervised the monopoly because an agency of
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (municipalities may seek explicit state authorization for each an-
ticompetitive act).
,, See supra note 35 (courts reach different conclusions on similar fact situations).
Compare Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-352) (court granted exemption
when no explicit statutory provision authorized exclusive airport service operation) with
Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 554-56 (M.D.N.C. 1979)
(court denied exemption when statute provided for service franchises if public's use of air-
port not diminished thereby).
147 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43-57 (1982).
... See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 963-67; see also supra notes 94-102 and accompany-
ing text (state clearly contemplated city taking effective measures to insure efficient
emergency ambulance service).
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51 n.14.
, See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 966-67
(W.D. Mo. 1982) (active state supervision satisfied by interaction of state and local regula-
tion of ambulance service industry); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187,
1195-96 (6th Cir. 1981) (active state supervision found for municipal solid waste monopoly),
vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (no
statutory provisions to satisfy either part of Midcal test for steamship authority and town
allegedly engaged in monopolizing local parking market); Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake,
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, 76,330 (D. Colo. 1980) (state supervision of municipal zon-
ing authority found in detailed statutory scheme); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of
Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (no statutory provisions providing clearly
articulated state policy or active state supervision of exclusive cable television franchising
by municipality).
," 654 F.2d 1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
' Id. at 1195-96.
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the state, the Water Authority, maintained "some oversight" of the
facility.153 The Supreme Court, however, vacated and remanded Hybud
for reconsideration in light of Boulder."4 In Hybud, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the home rule pro-
visions of the Ohio Constitution to satisfy the clear state articulation re-
quirement of Midcal.55 The United States Supreme Court probably
vacated the Hybud decision because the Sixth Circuit improperly relied
on a home rule amendment to establish sufficient state authorization of
the challenged monopoly rather than for an inadequate showing of active
state supervision of the monopoly."'
In Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake,"7 the District Court for the
District of Colorado found adequate state supervision of a municipal zon-
ing authority under a state statutory scheme that required local public
hearings on all zoning activities, required the establishment of a board of
adjustment to hear appeals and review any zoning order, and subjected
all adjustment board decisions to state court review.' Stauffer in-
15 Id.
154 Hybud, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
"5 Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1195.
156 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 43-57; see also supra note 131 (Hybud court may have relied
erroneously on state supreme court interpretation of home rule status in granting antitrust
exemption to city).
,s 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980).
'5 Id. at 76,330. The Stauffer court did not grant an antitrust exemption to the town of
Stauffer or the town's zoning board, despite a finding that the defendants had proper
authorization under the Midcal test. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff alleged miscon-
duct on the part of members of the zoning board by attempting to obtain the plaintiffs prop-
erty to promote their own interests and economic benefit. Id. The court held that the state
legislature did not contemplate or intend zoning officials to exploit official positions to ad-
vance personal interests. Id. The Stauffer court referred to a statement in the Lafayette
decision to support the proposition that "even a lawful monopolist is subject to antitrust
restraints when the monopolist seeks to extend or exploit the monopoly in a manner not
consistent with the governmental authorization." Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 417 (1978).
The idea that state and local governments, agencies, and officials may be liable under
antitrust laws for abusing legitimate grants of authority from the state dates as far back as
dicta in Parker. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943); see also supra note 17
(citing Parker dicta). Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lafayette, expressed his opposition to
state immunization for local governments engaged in conspiracies against private parties.
See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In several recent cases, courts
have refused to grant exemptions to local governments for conduct legally authorized by
the state when the plaintiffs alleged conspiracy or misconduct between the local govern-
ments and private individuals. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 379-82 (5th Cir.
1977) (court denied exemption when plaintiff alleged zoning ordinance that precluded sale of
liquor on his land was part of conspiracy to restrain competition in liquor business), remanded
for reconsideration in light of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763, 776-77 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (exemption denied when plaintiff alleged conspiracy between local officials and
private developers in exercising eminent domain powers for sham redevelopment project);
Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 (N.D. Iowa 1979)
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dicated a rather detailed supervisory scheme to oversee the activity of
zoning, whereas Hybud presented little evidence of state supervision.'59
In effect, even the Stauffer scheme mandates a system of review rather
than actual supervision at the state level, although the system does pro-
vide for redress in the state courts.'
6
0
The Gold Cross court applied the second prong of the Midcal test
and found adequate state supervision of the ambulance service industry
in a statutory scheme providing for the licensing and periodic inspection
of ambulance vehicles and personnel.'"' But the Gold Cross court also
found the active supervision requirement independently satisfied by the
interaction of the state statute authorizing the city to formulate rules
and regulations for the use of ambulance equipment with the city's
organized system of review and enforcement of the ordinance establish-
ing an exclusive ambulance service.'
Commentators disagree in their interpretation of the Midcal active
state supervision requirement.'" One commentator suggests that the re-
quirement is an unjustified burden upon a state because the requirement
forces the state to "command" and "control" local regulation when the
state already has indicated an otherwise legitimate state policy to
displace competition at the local level.' 64 Another commentator asserts
that the Supreme Court's emphasis on supervision implies a require-
ment for state scrutiny and deliberation but not actual command. 6' If the
Stauffer, Hybud, and Gold Cross decisions are examples of an acceptable
level of state supervision, then the latter view appears correct. 6
If the Supreme Court decides that municipalities must satisfy the
second prong of Midcal, many municipalities appear unlikely to meet the
active state supervision requirement."' Probably the states will not
have provided a system of review for the local activity, either out of
(court denied immunity because state zoning statute did not authorize denial of plaintiff's
rezoning application when city officials and developers of downtown shopping center agreed
to exclude competitive development projects). But see Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of
Mason City, 671 F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1982) (affirming jury verdict in favor of defendant
city). See also Areeda, supra note 127, at 450-53 (most conspiracy claims highly conclusory
but survive dismissal under notice pleading).
... See Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1195-96; Stauffer, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, 76,330
(D. Colo. 1980).
" Stauffer, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029, 76,330 (D. Colo. 1980).
,.' Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 966-67. In Gold Cross, the state statutory scheme provided
for licensing and periodic inspection of ambulances in addition to an administrative hearing
if a licensing officer revoked a license. Id. at 966.
162 Id.
" See Areeda, supra note 127, at 438 n.19; Page, supra note 135, at 1129.
" Page, supra note 135, at 1129.
" Areeda, supra note 127, at 438 n.19.
le See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 966-67; Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1195-96; Stauffer, 1981-1
Trade Cas. at 76,330.
"' See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69-71, 71 n.6
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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neglect or because of practical limitations."8 Arguably, imposition of the
second prong of the Midcal test relegates local governments to the
status of private entities seeking state immunity.'89 Yet local govern-
ments often have more pressing reasons than private entities for
displacing competition, particularly when local governments act in areas
of traditional government function. 70 A compromise approach taking in-
to consideration the difference between municipalities and private
defendants would take into account the Boulder dissent's proposal that a
city's own supervisory scheme be used to satisfy the second Midcal re-
quirement."'
The Gold Cross court found active supervision partially satisfied by
the city's own system of review and enforcement of the anticompetitive
action .1 7 The Gold Cross decision is consistent with the Boulder dissent's
version of the active state supervision requirement.1 1 If insufficient
supervision or review exists at the state level, a court still could grant
an antitrust exemption if the locality had initiated a supervisory scheme
or system of review for the challenged activity.' Should the Supreme
Court require state supervision in municipal antitrust cases, the Court
probably would justify the requirement by reasoning that the state, a
presumably impartial party, can better guarantee fairness in the en-
forcement of any local anticompetitive action. 75 In the absence of a con-
spiracy between a local government and a private party, however, the
local government could insure fairness as well as the state through a
local supervisory scheme that the city probably could implement more
easily than any state supervisory system.Y
Many questions remain unanswered regarding the application of the
two-part Midcal test to municipalities. 7  The clear articulation require-
ment fails to indicate how explicit state statutory authorization should
'" See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69-71, 71 n.6
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 434-38 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas
City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 966-67 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
1. See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 967 (court found active state supervision of an-
ticompetitive ordinance).
"o See id. (city's action motivated by concern for public health and safety).
. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 966-67.
1 Compare Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (equating local supervis-
ion to state supervision) with Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 966-67 (state supervision require-
ment satisfied by local supervision authorized by state statute).
1.. See Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp. at 966-67.
"I See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1979).
178 See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gold Cross, 538 F. Supp.
at 966-67.
17 See supra notes 110-37 & 149-76 and accompanying text (reviewing recent decisions
applying clear articulation and active state supervision requirements to municipal and local
governments seeking antitrust immunity).
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be to exempt a challenged local action."" Additionally, the Supreme
Court did not indicate clearly whether mere contemplation by the state
would satisfy the clear articulation requirement."9 Further, assuming
the legitimacy of a contemplation standard, the Court never stated how
broadly a lower court could interpret contemplation by the state to
grant an antitrust exemption for a contested local action. 8 ' The Supreme
Court also left open the possibility of applying the active state supervi-
sion requirement of Midcal in municipal antitrust cases.18' The Court
ultimately may decide not to apply the second Midcal requirement in
view of the practical problems that could arise by imposing active state
supervision over all local anticompetitive activities.82 But in the mean-
time, federal courts that apply the second Midcal requirement must
decide without Supreme Court guidance what constitutes proper state
supervision of a local anticompetitive activity."
The Boulder Court's failure either to clarify the clear articulation re-
quirement or to reconcile the requirement with the state contemplation
standard probably will result in inconsistent decisions in federal courts
addressing the issue of municipal antitrust immunity." Thus, a
municipal litigant's claim of state action exemption ultimately may suc-
ceed or fail depending on the particular federal court in which the
municipal litigant appears. 8 ' The Supreme Court should move to end the
confusion and attempt to restore some uniformity by either strictly
defining or widening the leeway a district court has in interpreting
statutory language.88 If the Supreme Court ultimately decides to require
municipalities to satisfy the Midcal test's second prong, active state
supervision, then the Court should allow municipalities to rely on locally
initiated supervisory schemes to maintain a state action defense. 87 In ef-
fect, local supervision may insure the same objective as a state author-
17 See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text (courts reach different conclusions on
similar factual situations or same conclusion using different levels of statutory authoriza-
tion).
19 See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text ("contemplation" standard's
usefulness when court's search for state authorization limited to statutory language).
18 See id.
1.. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (Boulder Court found it unnecessary
to address second Midcal requirement because city failed first requirement).
'8 See supra notes 70 & 167-71 and accompanying text (requiring state supervision
over local activities may tax state resources).
"I See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text (reviewing decisions that have re-
quired active state supervision).
'" See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (courts reaching different conclusions
on similar factual situations; supra note 35 (same).
28 See id.
"4 See supra notes 134-37 & 146-48 and accompanying text (proposing narrowing or
widening of clear articulation test to achieve consistent decisions).
" See supra notes 68-69, 161-62 & 172-76 and accompanying text (reviewing Boulder
dissent recommendation on active state supervision and Gold Cross decision).
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ized supervisory scheme.'88 Until the Supreme Court decides on the ap-
plication of the second prong of Midcal, however, some federal courts
may require a standard of active state supervision that municipalities
will find impossible to meet.'89
W. GERARD FALLON, JR.
' See id. (local government can insure fairness objective as well as state and can
supervise more easily than state).
189 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text; Page, supra note 135, at 1129.
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